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Prolegomena to a Theory of Pleasure

When philosophers write about pleasure, they often understand it to include "all pleasant feeling or experience, such as elation, ecstasy, delight, joy, and enjoyment," and pain to include "all unpleasant feeling or experience: aches, throbs, irritations, anxiety, anguish, chagrin, discomfort, despair, grief, depression, guilt and remorse." They believe that what gives us pleasure are momentary states which we seek, and what gives us pain are momentary states which we avoid. They often argue against motivational hedonism - that humans maximize the balance of pleasure over pain thus construed - because it cannot accommodate acts of self-sacrifice and many other phenomena of human behavior.

Let us call the kind of pleasure just mentioned pleasantness. I propose to focus on a different concept of pleasure, which I call pleasurability (and its opposite, painfulness). This involves postulating that a human life is a fabric of episodes, whose pleasurability we judge just as ineluctably as we experience the pleasantness of a moment. When we judge the pleasurability of an episode, its unfolding in real time is less important than the sequence of emotions it afforded. For an episode to be pleasurable, it need not (and probably cannot) consist only of pleasant moments. I will illustrate these ideas by describing a research project - now just underway - on the pleasurability of a basketball game. I will also argue that the value of episodes is not only determined by their pleasurability, but also by their depth. I will conclude my talk by re-examining hedonism and argue that this framework that could serve as a foundation on which to build a theory of decision making as well as a theory of well-being.